fix issues with phase-32
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@@ -58,7 +58,11 @@ public class GcsScoringService : BackgroundService
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evt.Value,
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stoppingToken);
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if (outcome.Outcome == GcsOutcome.ScoreComputed)
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if (outcome.Outcome == GcsOutcome.EncounterNotFound)
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_logger.LogWarning(
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"Skipping stale observation.recorded event — encounter={Id} code={Code} offset={Offset}",
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evt.EncounterId, evt.ObservationCode, result.Offset.Value);
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else if (outcome.Outcome == GcsOutcome.ScoreComputed)
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_logger.LogInformation(
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"GCS scored via consumer — encounter={Id} total={Total} class={Class}",
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evt.EncounterId, outcome.TotalScore, outcome.Classification);
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@@ -58,7 +58,11 @@ public class News2ScoringService : BackgroundService
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evt.Value,
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stoppingToken);
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if (outcome.Outcome == News2Outcome.ScoreComputed)
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if (outcome.Outcome == News2Outcome.EncounterNotFound)
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_logger.LogWarning(
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"Skipping stale observation.recorded event — encounter={Id} code={Code} offset={Offset}",
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evt.EncounterId, evt.ObservationCode, result.Offset.Value);
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else if (outcome.Outcome == News2Outcome.ScoreComputed)
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_logger.LogInformation(
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"NEWS2 scored via consumer — encounter={Id} score={Score} risk={Risk}",
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evt.EncounterId, outcome.TotalScore, outcome.RiskLevel);
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@@ -2,5 +2,6 @@ public enum GcsOutcome
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{
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NotGcsCode,
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IncompleteComponents,
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EncounterNotFound,
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ScoreComputed
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}
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@@ -2,5 +2,6 @@ public enum News2Outcome
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{
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NotNews2Code,
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IncompleteParameters,
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EncounterNotFound,
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ScoreComputed
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}
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@@ -60,6 +60,17 @@ public class GcsDetector
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var classification = GcsCalculator.ClassifyGcs(total);
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var calculatedAt = DateTimeOffset.UtcNow;
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using (var checkScope = _services.CreateScope())
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{
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var db = checkScope.ServiceProvider.GetRequiredService<AppDbContext>();
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if (!await db.Encounters.AnyAsync(e => e.Id == encounterId, ct))
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{
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_logger.LogWarning(
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"Skipping GCS score for unknown encounter {EncounterId}", encounterId);
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return GcsResult.EncounterNotFound;
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}
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}
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await PersistScoreAsync(
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encounterId, patientId, (int)eye, (int)verbal, (int)motor,
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total, classification, calculatedAt, ct);
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@@ -43,13 +43,8 @@ namespace VigilCareClinicalAPI.Migrations
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name: "name_search_token",
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table: "patients");
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migrationBuilder.AlterColumn<DateOnly>(
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name: "date_of_birth",
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table: "patients",
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type: "date",
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nullable: false,
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oldClrType: typeof(string),
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oldType: "text");
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migrationBuilder.Sql(
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"ALTER TABLE patients ALTER COLUMN date_of_birth TYPE date USING date_of_birth::date;");
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}
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}
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}
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@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ public record GcsResult(
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int PresentComponents = 0)
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{
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public static readonly GcsResult NotGcsCode = new(GcsOutcome.NotGcsCode);
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public static readonly GcsResult EncounterNotFound = new(GcsOutcome.EncounterNotFound);
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public static GcsResult IncompleteComponents(int presentCount) =>
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new(GcsOutcome.IncompleteComponents, PresentComponents: presentCount);
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@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ public record News2Result(
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bool HasSingleParamThree = false)
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{
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public static readonly News2Result NotNews2Code = new(News2Outcome.NotNews2Code);
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public static readonly News2Result EncounterNotFound = new(News2Outcome.EncounterNotFound);
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public static News2Result IncompleteParameters(int presentCount) =>
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new(News2Outcome.IncompleteParameters, PresentParameters: presentCount);
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@@ -103,6 +103,17 @@ public class News2Detector
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var hasSingleParamThree = paramScores.Any(s => s == 3);
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var riskLevel = News2Calculator.DetermineRiskLevel(totalScore, hasSingleParamThree);
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using (var scope = _services.CreateScope())
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{
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var db = scope.ServiceProvider.GetRequiredService<AppDbContext>();
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if (!await db.Encounters.AnyAsync(e => e.Id == encounterId, ct))
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{
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_logger.LogWarning(
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"Skipping NEWS2 score for unknown encounter {EncounterId}", encounterId);
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return News2Result.EncounterNotFound;
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}
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}
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await PersistScoreAsync(
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encounterId, patientId, totalScore, riskLevel,
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paramScores, hasSingleParamThree, ct);
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@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
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# PHI Encryption & Access Logging — Operations Runbook
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Phase 32 encrypts sensitive patient demographics at rest and records who accessed PHI. This runbook covers key management, migration, rotation, compliance, and troubleshooting.
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---
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## Architecture summary
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| Layer | Mechanism |
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|---|---|
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| Encryption at rest | ASP.NET Data Protection API (AES-256-GCM) via EF Core value converters |
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| Encrypted columns | `first_name`, `last_name`, `date_of_birth`, `allergies`, `emergency_contact_name`, `emergency_contact_phone` |
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| Plaintext (by design) | `mrn` — exact-match lookup only |
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| Name search | HMAC-SHA256 `name_search_token` index — search without decrypting all rows |
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| Access audit | Append-only `phi_access_logs` table; written by `PhiAccessLogService` on patient Get/List/Register/Update |
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Configuration lives in `appsettings.json` under `PhiEncryption` and `DataProtection`. Implementation: `PhiEncryptionService`, `PatientPhiConverterConfigurator`, `PatientService`.
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---
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## Secrets and key storage
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**Never commit:**
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- `data-protection-keys/` (Data Protection key ring)
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- Production `PhiEncryption:SearchTokenKey`
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- Any Key Vault / KMS credentials
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`data-protection-keys/` is listed in `.gitignore`. Treat loss of this directory as **unrecoverable data loss** for encrypted PHI columns.
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| Environment | Data Protection key ring | Search HMAC key (`SearchTokenKey`) |
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|---|---|---|
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| Development | `./data-protection-keys/` on disk (`DataProtection:KeyPath`) | `appsettings.json` (dev placeholder only) |
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| Production | Azure Key Vault XML blob or AWS KMS-backed store | Key Vault / Secrets Manager secret — **not** appsettings |
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---
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## Initial deployment / encrypting existing rows
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New patients are encrypted automatically on save. Existing plaintext rows need a one-time re-save.
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### Option A — CLI (recommended)
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```bash
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./scripts/encrypt-existing-patient-phi.sh
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```
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Or directly:
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```bash
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dotnet run --project VigilCareClinicalAPI -- encrypt-phi
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```
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Loads every patient through EF, applies value converters, and recomputes `name_search_token`.
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### Option B — Startup hosted service
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`PatientPhiMigrationService` runs on application start and backfills search tokens for rows that are not yet encrypted. It is registered in `Program.cs`. Disable or remove after the first successful production deploy to avoid redundant work on every restart.
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---
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## Verifying encryption
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### Automated tests
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```bash
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dotnet test VigilCareClinicalAPI.Tests --filter "FullyQualifiedName~PhiEncryption"
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```
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### Live stack (API + Postgres running)
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```bash
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./scripts/run-phase32-verification.sh
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```
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### Manual DB check
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Encrypted `first_name` values will **not** equal the patient's plaintext name:
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```sql
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SELECT id, mrn, left(first_name, 30) AS encrypted_prefix
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FROM patients
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LIMIT 5;
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```
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Prefix often starts with `CfDJ8` (Data Protection default).
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### PHI access logs
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```bash
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# Admin token required (AuditRead permission)
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curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
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"http://localhost:5270/api/v1/phi-access-logs?patientId=<uuid>"
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```
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Prometheus metric: `phi_access_logs_total{access_type="VIEW|LIST|SEARCH|CREATE|UPDATE"}`.
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---
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## Key rotation
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**Always back up the current key ring before rotating.**
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### Encryption keys (Data Protection)
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1. Snapshot `data-protection-keys/` (or export Key Vault blob).
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2. Deploy new key ring **alongside** the old one (Data Protection supports multiple keys; newest encrypts, all decrypt).
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3. Change `PhiEncryption:ProtectorPurpose` to a new version string (e.g. `VigilCare.PatientPhi.v2`).
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4. Re-run encrypt command to re-encrypt all patient rows with the new protector:
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```bash
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dotnet run --project VigilCareClinicalAPI -- encrypt-phi
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```
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5. Verify API reads and raw DB ciphertext look correct.
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6. Retire old keys only after confirming all rows decrypt successfully.
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### Search HMAC key (`SearchTokenKey`)
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1. Store new key in secrets manager.
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2. Update `PhiEncryption:SearchTokenKey` in configuration.
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3. Re-run `encrypt-phi` (recomputes all `name_search_token` values).
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4. Confirm name search still works (`GET /api/v1/patients?q=First+Last`).
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Rotating one key without the other does not require touching the other, but both rotations need a full patient re-save.
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---
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## PHI access log retention (HIPAA)
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`phi_access_logs` records who accessed patient demographics, when, from which path, and (hashed) search terms. HIPAA requires audit controls; retention guidance is **minimum 6 years**.
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This phase creates the table and query API (`GET /api/v1/phi-access-logs`). Automated retention/archival policy is **out of scope** — plan for Phase 33+ (partitioning, cold storage, or purge job with legal review).
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Query endpoints:
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| Endpoint | Permission |
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|---|---|
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| `GET /api/v1/phi-access-logs` | `AuditRead` |
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| `GET /api/v1/phi-access-logs/patients/{id}` | `PatientsRead` |
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---
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## Cross-system PHI (out of scope)
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These paths are **not** covered by column encryption in PostgreSQL:
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| System | Risk | Action |
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|---|---|---|
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| Elasticsearch patient documents | May index decrypted names at index time | Exclude PHI fields or accept decrypted-at-index policy |
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| Kafka / data lake Parquet events | `patientName` in outbox payloads (e.g. encounter events) | Review lake schemas; redact or tokenize in a future phase |
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| Application logs | Serilog must not log PHI fields | Audit log configuration |
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---
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## Troubleshooting
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### `CryptographicException` / cannot decrypt patient
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- Key ring missing or wrong `DataProtection:KeyPath`
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- App deployed to new host without copying `data-protection-keys/`
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- `ProtectorPurpose` changed without re-running `encrypt-phi`
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**Fix:** Restore key ring from backup. Do not delete old keys until all data is re-encrypted.
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### Name search returns no results
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- `name_search_token` is null on older rows → run `encrypt-phi`
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- `SearchTokenKey` changed without token recompute
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- Query format: two-term search uses `First Last` (space-separated); single term matches first or last name only
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### PHI access logs empty
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- Caller not authenticated (`PhiAccessLogService` skips unauthenticated requests)
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- `PhiEncryption:LogListAccess` is `false` (list/search aggregate logs suppressed)
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- Integration/FHIR paths must still authenticate (Phase 31 Integration role)
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### Column length errors on encrypt
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Migration `WidenPhiEncryptedColumns` widens `first_name`, `last_name`, and emergency contact columns to `text`. Ciphertext is longer than plaintext. If new columns are added to encryption, ensure DB column types accommodate protected payload size.
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### Tests fail with 500 on patient register
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- Confirm migrations applied (`AddPatientNameSearchToken`, `AddPhiAccessLogs`, `WidenPhiEncryptedColumns`)
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- Confirm `PhiEncryption:SearchTokenKey` is set in configuration
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- Confirm `data-protection-keys/` is writable in the API working directory
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---
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## Related files
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| File | Purpose |
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|---|---|
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| `VigilCareClinicalAPI/Services/PhiEncryptionService.cs` | Encrypt/decrypt + HMAC tokens |
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| `VigilCareClinicalAPI/Services/PhiAccessLogService.cs` | Access audit writes |
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| `VigilCareClinicalAPI/Commands/EncryptPhiCommand.cs` | Bulk re-save CLI |
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| `VigilCareClinicalAPI/BackgroundServices/PatientPhiMigrationService.cs` | Startup token backfill |
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| `scripts/encrypt-existing-patient-phi.sh` | Wrapper for encrypt CLI |
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| `scripts/run-phase32-verification.sh` | End-to-end verification |
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| `docs/plans/phase-32-plan.md` | Implementation plan and design rationale |
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Regular → Executable
-4
@@ -5,7 +5,3 @@ ROOT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
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echo "Re-save all patients through EF to apply encryption converters..."
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dotnet run --project "${ROOT_DIR}/VigilCareClinicalAPI" --no-build -- encrypt-phi
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```
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```bash
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chmod +x scripts/encrypt-existing-patient-phi.sh
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Regular → Executable
+1
-1
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ curl -sf "${BASE_URL}/api/v1/phi-access-logs?patientId=${PATIENT_ID}" \
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-H "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" | jq -e '.data.totalCount >= 1'
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echo "Verify raw DB encryption (requires psql)"
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docker compose exec -T postgres psql -U vigilcare -d vigilcare -c \
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docker compose exec -T postgres psql -U postgres -d vigilcare -c \
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"SELECT id, left(first_name, 20) AS encrypted_prefix FROM patients WHERE id = '${PATIENT_ID}';"
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echo "Phase 32 verification complete."
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