fix issues with phase-32

This commit is contained in:
voltsrage
2026-06-23 00:16:39 +08:00
parent 1824e4eef1
commit 90b8baa2a1
12 changed files with 237 additions and 14 deletions
@@ -58,7 +58,11 @@ public class GcsScoringService : BackgroundService
evt.Value, evt.Value,
stoppingToken); stoppingToken);
if (outcome.Outcome == GcsOutcome.ScoreComputed) if (outcome.Outcome == GcsOutcome.EncounterNotFound)
_logger.LogWarning(
"Skipping stale observation.recorded event — encounter={Id} code={Code} offset={Offset}",
evt.EncounterId, evt.ObservationCode, result.Offset.Value);
else if (outcome.Outcome == GcsOutcome.ScoreComputed)
_logger.LogInformation( _logger.LogInformation(
"GCS scored via consumer — encounter={Id} total={Total} class={Class}", "GCS scored via consumer — encounter={Id} total={Total} class={Class}",
evt.EncounterId, outcome.TotalScore, outcome.Classification); evt.EncounterId, outcome.TotalScore, outcome.Classification);
@@ -58,7 +58,11 @@ public class News2ScoringService : BackgroundService
evt.Value, evt.Value,
stoppingToken); stoppingToken);
if (outcome.Outcome == News2Outcome.ScoreComputed) if (outcome.Outcome == News2Outcome.EncounterNotFound)
_logger.LogWarning(
"Skipping stale observation.recorded event — encounter={Id} code={Code} offset={Offset}",
evt.EncounterId, evt.ObservationCode, result.Offset.Value);
else if (outcome.Outcome == News2Outcome.ScoreComputed)
_logger.LogInformation( _logger.LogInformation(
"NEWS2 scored via consumer — encounter={Id} score={Score} risk={Risk}", "NEWS2 scored via consumer — encounter={Id} score={Score} risk={Risk}",
evt.EncounterId, outcome.TotalScore, outcome.RiskLevel); evt.EncounterId, outcome.TotalScore, outcome.RiskLevel);
@@ -2,5 +2,6 @@ public enum GcsOutcome
{ {
NotGcsCode, NotGcsCode,
IncompleteComponents, IncompleteComponents,
EncounterNotFound,
ScoreComputed ScoreComputed
} }
@@ -2,5 +2,6 @@ public enum News2Outcome
{ {
NotNews2Code, NotNews2Code,
IncompleteParameters, IncompleteParameters,
EncounterNotFound,
ScoreComputed ScoreComputed
} }
+11
View File
@@ -60,6 +60,17 @@ public class GcsDetector
var classification = GcsCalculator.ClassifyGcs(total); var classification = GcsCalculator.ClassifyGcs(total);
var calculatedAt = DateTimeOffset.UtcNow; var calculatedAt = DateTimeOffset.UtcNow;
using (var checkScope = _services.CreateScope())
{
var db = checkScope.ServiceProvider.GetRequiredService<AppDbContext>();
if (!await db.Encounters.AnyAsync(e => e.Id == encounterId, ct))
{
_logger.LogWarning(
"Skipping GCS score for unknown encounter {EncounterId}", encounterId);
return GcsResult.EncounterNotFound;
}
}
await PersistScoreAsync( await PersistScoreAsync(
encounterId, patientId, (int)eye, (int)verbal, (int)motor, encounterId, patientId, (int)eye, (int)verbal, (int)motor,
total, classification, calculatedAt, ct); total, classification, calculatedAt, ct);
@@ -43,13 +43,8 @@ namespace VigilCareClinicalAPI.Migrations
name: "name_search_token", name: "name_search_token",
table: "patients"); table: "patients");
migrationBuilder.AlterColumn<DateOnly>( migrationBuilder.Sql(
name: "date_of_birth", "ALTER TABLE patients ALTER COLUMN date_of_birth TYPE date USING date_of_birth::date;");
table: "patients",
type: "date",
nullable: false,
oldClrType: typeof(string),
oldType: "text");
} }
} }
} }
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ public record GcsResult(
int PresentComponents = 0) int PresentComponents = 0)
{ {
public static readonly GcsResult NotGcsCode = new(GcsOutcome.NotGcsCode); public static readonly GcsResult NotGcsCode = new(GcsOutcome.NotGcsCode);
public static readonly GcsResult EncounterNotFound = new(GcsOutcome.EncounterNotFound);
public static GcsResult IncompleteComponents(int presentCount) => public static GcsResult IncompleteComponents(int presentCount) =>
new(GcsOutcome.IncompleteComponents, PresentComponents: presentCount); new(GcsOutcome.IncompleteComponents, PresentComponents: presentCount);
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ public record News2Result(
bool HasSingleParamThree = false) bool HasSingleParamThree = false)
{ {
public static readonly News2Result NotNews2Code = new(News2Outcome.NotNews2Code); public static readonly News2Result NotNews2Code = new(News2Outcome.NotNews2Code);
public static readonly News2Result EncounterNotFound = new(News2Outcome.EncounterNotFound);
public static News2Result IncompleteParameters(int presentCount) => public static News2Result IncompleteParameters(int presentCount) =>
new(News2Outcome.IncompleteParameters, PresentParameters: presentCount); new(News2Outcome.IncompleteParameters, PresentParameters: presentCount);
@@ -103,6 +103,17 @@ public class News2Detector
var hasSingleParamThree = paramScores.Any(s => s == 3); var hasSingleParamThree = paramScores.Any(s => s == 3);
var riskLevel = News2Calculator.DetermineRiskLevel(totalScore, hasSingleParamThree); var riskLevel = News2Calculator.DetermineRiskLevel(totalScore, hasSingleParamThree);
using (var scope = _services.CreateScope())
{
var db = scope.ServiceProvider.GetRequiredService<AppDbContext>();
if (!await db.Encounters.AnyAsync(e => e.Id == encounterId, ct))
{
_logger.LogWarning(
"Skipping NEWS2 score for unknown encounter {EncounterId}", encounterId);
return News2Result.EncounterNotFound;
}
}
await PersistScoreAsync( await PersistScoreAsync(
encounterId, patientId, totalScore, riskLevel, encounterId, patientId, totalScore, riskLevel,
paramScores, hasSingleParamThree, ct); paramScores, hasSingleParamThree, ct);
+198
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
# PHI Encryption & Access Logging — Operations Runbook
Phase 32 encrypts sensitive patient demographics at rest and records who accessed PHI. This runbook covers key management, migration, rotation, compliance, and troubleshooting.
---
## Architecture summary
| Layer | Mechanism |
|---|---|
| Encryption at rest | ASP.NET Data Protection API (AES-256-GCM) via EF Core value converters |
| Encrypted columns | `first_name`, `last_name`, `date_of_birth`, `allergies`, `emergency_contact_name`, `emergency_contact_phone` |
| Plaintext (by design) | `mrn` — exact-match lookup only |
| Name search | HMAC-SHA256 `name_search_token` index — search without decrypting all rows |
| Access audit | Append-only `phi_access_logs` table; written by `PhiAccessLogService` on patient Get/List/Register/Update |
Configuration lives in `appsettings.json` under `PhiEncryption` and `DataProtection`. Implementation: `PhiEncryptionService`, `PatientPhiConverterConfigurator`, `PatientService`.
---
## Secrets and key storage
**Never commit:**
- `data-protection-keys/` (Data Protection key ring)
- Production `PhiEncryption:SearchTokenKey`
- Any Key Vault / KMS credentials
`data-protection-keys/` is listed in `.gitignore`. Treat loss of this directory as **unrecoverable data loss** for encrypted PHI columns.
| Environment | Data Protection key ring | Search HMAC key (`SearchTokenKey`) |
|---|---|---|
| Development | `./data-protection-keys/` on disk (`DataProtection:KeyPath`) | `appsettings.json` (dev placeholder only) |
| Production | Azure Key Vault XML blob or AWS KMS-backed store | Key Vault / Secrets Manager secret — **not** appsettings |
---
## Initial deployment / encrypting existing rows
New patients are encrypted automatically on save. Existing plaintext rows need a one-time re-save.
### Option A — CLI (recommended)
```bash
./scripts/encrypt-existing-patient-phi.sh
```
Or directly:
```bash
dotnet run --project VigilCareClinicalAPI -- encrypt-phi
```
Loads every patient through EF, applies value converters, and recomputes `name_search_token`.
### Option B — Startup hosted service
`PatientPhiMigrationService` runs on application start and backfills search tokens for rows that are not yet encrypted. It is registered in `Program.cs`. Disable or remove after the first successful production deploy to avoid redundant work on every restart.
---
## Verifying encryption
### Automated tests
```bash
dotnet test VigilCareClinicalAPI.Tests --filter "FullyQualifiedName~PhiEncryption"
```
### Live stack (API + Postgres running)
```bash
./scripts/run-phase32-verification.sh
```
### Manual DB check
Encrypted `first_name` values will **not** equal the patient's plaintext name:
```sql
SELECT id, mrn, left(first_name, 30) AS encrypted_prefix
FROM patients
LIMIT 5;
```
Prefix often starts with `CfDJ8` (Data Protection default).
### PHI access logs
```bash
# Admin token required (AuditRead permission)
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"http://localhost:5270/api/v1/phi-access-logs?patientId=<uuid>"
```
Prometheus metric: `phi_access_logs_total{access_type="VIEW|LIST|SEARCH|CREATE|UPDATE"}`.
---
## Key rotation
**Always back up the current key ring before rotating.**
### Encryption keys (Data Protection)
1. Snapshot `data-protection-keys/` (or export Key Vault blob).
2. Deploy new key ring **alongside** the old one (Data Protection supports multiple keys; newest encrypts, all decrypt).
3. Change `PhiEncryption:ProtectorPurpose` to a new version string (e.g. `VigilCare.PatientPhi.v2`).
4. Re-run encrypt command to re-encrypt all patient rows with the new protector:
```bash
dotnet run --project VigilCareClinicalAPI -- encrypt-phi
```
5. Verify API reads and raw DB ciphertext look correct.
6. Retire old keys only after confirming all rows decrypt successfully.
### Search HMAC key (`SearchTokenKey`)
1. Store new key in secrets manager.
2. Update `PhiEncryption:SearchTokenKey` in configuration.
3. Re-run `encrypt-phi` (recomputes all `name_search_token` values).
4. Confirm name search still works (`GET /api/v1/patients?q=First+Last`).
Rotating one key without the other does not require touching the other, but both rotations need a full patient re-save.
---
## PHI access log retention (HIPAA)
`phi_access_logs` records who accessed patient demographics, when, from which path, and (hashed) search terms. HIPAA requires audit controls; retention guidance is **minimum 6 years**.
This phase creates the table and query API (`GET /api/v1/phi-access-logs`). Automated retention/archival policy is **out of scope** — plan for Phase 33+ (partitioning, cold storage, or purge job with legal review).
Query endpoints:
| Endpoint | Permission |
|---|---|
| `GET /api/v1/phi-access-logs` | `AuditRead` |
| `GET /api/v1/phi-access-logs/patients/{id}` | `PatientsRead` |
---
## Cross-system PHI (out of scope)
These paths are **not** covered by column encryption in PostgreSQL:
| System | Risk | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Elasticsearch patient documents | May index decrypted names at index time | Exclude PHI fields or accept decrypted-at-index policy |
| Kafka / data lake Parquet events | `patientName` in outbox payloads (e.g. encounter events) | Review lake schemas; redact or tokenize in a future phase |
| Application logs | Serilog must not log PHI fields | Audit log configuration |
---
## Troubleshooting
### `CryptographicException` / cannot decrypt patient
- Key ring missing or wrong `DataProtection:KeyPath`
- App deployed to new host without copying `data-protection-keys/`
- `ProtectorPurpose` changed without re-running `encrypt-phi`
**Fix:** Restore key ring from backup. Do not delete old keys until all data is re-encrypted.
### Name search returns no results
- `name_search_token` is null on older rows → run `encrypt-phi`
- `SearchTokenKey` changed without token recompute
- Query format: two-term search uses `First Last` (space-separated); single term matches first or last name only
### PHI access logs empty
- Caller not authenticated (`PhiAccessLogService` skips unauthenticated requests)
- `PhiEncryption:LogListAccess` is `false` (list/search aggregate logs suppressed)
- Integration/FHIR paths must still authenticate (Phase 31 Integration role)
### Column length errors on encrypt
Migration `WidenPhiEncryptedColumns` widens `first_name`, `last_name`, and emergency contact columns to `text`. Ciphertext is longer than plaintext. If new columns are added to encryption, ensure DB column types accommodate protected payload size.
### Tests fail with 500 on patient register
- Confirm migrations applied (`AddPatientNameSearchToken`, `AddPhiAccessLogs`, `WidenPhiEncryptedColumns`)
- Confirm `PhiEncryption:SearchTokenKey` is set in configuration
- Confirm `data-protection-keys/` is writable in the API working directory
---
## Related files
| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `VigilCareClinicalAPI/Services/PhiEncryptionService.cs` | Encrypt/decrypt + HMAC tokens |
| `VigilCareClinicalAPI/Services/PhiAccessLogService.cs` | Access audit writes |
| `VigilCareClinicalAPI/Commands/EncryptPhiCommand.cs` | Bulk re-save CLI |
| `VigilCareClinicalAPI/BackgroundServices/PatientPhiMigrationService.cs` | Startup token backfill |
| `scripts/encrypt-existing-patient-phi.sh` | Wrapper for encrypt CLI |
| `scripts/run-phase32-verification.sh` | End-to-end verification |
| `docs/plans/phase-32-plan.md` | Implementation plan and design rationale |
-4
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,3 @@ ROOT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
echo "Re-save all patients through EF to apply encryption converters..." echo "Re-save all patients through EF to apply encryption converters..."
dotnet run --project "${ROOT_DIR}/VigilCareClinicalAPI" --no-build -- encrypt-phi dotnet run --project "${ROOT_DIR}/VigilCareClinicalAPI" --no-build -- encrypt-phi
```
```bash
chmod +x scripts/encrypt-existing-patient-phi.sh
+1 -1
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ curl -sf "${BASE_URL}/api/v1/phi-access-logs?patientId=${PATIENT_ID}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" | jq -e '.data.totalCount >= 1' -H "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" | jq -e '.data.totalCount >= 1'
echo "Verify raw DB encryption (requires psql)" echo "Verify raw DB encryption (requires psql)"
docker compose exec -T postgres psql -U vigilcare -d vigilcare -c \ docker compose exec -T postgres psql -U postgres -d vigilcare -c \
"SELECT id, left(first_name, 20) AS encrypted_prefix FROM patients WHERE id = '${PATIENT_ID}';" "SELECT id, left(first_name, 20) AS encrypted_prefix FROM patients WHERE id = '${PATIENT_ID}';"
echo "Phase 32 verification complete." echo "Phase 32 verification complete."